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This study investigates the effect that announcements of rights issues have on abnormal share price 
returns on the JSE over the period January 2009 to December 2014. This study will focus specifically 
on the equity element of the capital structure and the issuing of new equity in the form of rights 
issues. There have been a few studies done in this regard in the South African context but the prior 
papers have been conducted over significantly different time periods and data samples and there is 
therefore merit in combining all four approaches into a single study focused on one consistent data 
sample. Secondly, this study also investigates the impact the motivation for the rights issue as 
provided by the issuer, has on the share price returns of the issuers.  Thirdly, this study investigates 
the effect of the “financial health” of the rights issuer, as measured in terms of the Altman Z-score, 
has on the abnormal returns of the share prices of the issuers. The final area of investigation is to 
test the ability of rights issuers on the JSE to time the market when performing rights issues. An 
event study methodology was followed to calculate the abnormal share price returns of the events. 
An initial sample of 72 rights issue events were identified for the period between January 2009 and 
December 2014, but this was reduced to 25 events after various confounding events were 
eliminated. In line with the literature, the study found negative post-announcement abnormal share 
price returns following a rights issue. This indicates that the market perceives a rights issue as a 
negative signalling event and shows its unhappiness by punishing the share price. It was further  
found that issuers that reported that the proceeds of the rights issue was going to be used to repay 
outstanding debt had a larger negative post-announcement abnormal share price return than issuers 
reporting that the proceeds was going to be used for investment purposes. Thirdly, it was found that 
issuers that were classified as “healthy” had larger negative post-announcement abnormal share 
price returns than issuers classified as “unhealthy” and in the “grey” zone. No evidence of market 
timing was found. The evidence suggest that the market interprets rights issues as a negative signal 
from the management of the business, but that the signal is less negative when the issuer is 
“unhealthy” and the proceeds is used for investment purposes. The interpretation of the latter two 
findings, however, should be treated with some caution as size of the samples available for some of 




Keywords: Rights Issues, JSE, Event Study, Market Timing, Financial Health. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Background 
When applying financial management in practice, there are three crucial elements that must be 
considered at all times. These three elements, namely the company’s cost of capital, its value, and 
its capital structure, act as the financial lifeblood of any business, and are crucial in maintaining the 
financial wellbeing of the business. More important is the relationship between the three elements. 
When a company’s cost of capital is low, it conversely means that the value of the company is high. 
The relationship between the cost of capital and the capital structure of the company on the other 
hand is not so clear. This relationship has been the subject of much academic research and it still is 
not clear if different capital structures will have an impact on the cost of capital. One thing however 
is clear:  good corporate financial management should strive to create the capital structure which 
will maximise the intrinsic value of the business. This will be to the benefit of all parties invested in 
the business. Therefore the need arises to investigate the different elements that make up the 
capital structure. This study will focus specifically on the equity element of the capital structure and 
the issuing of new equity in the form of rights issues. There have been a few studies done in this 
regard in the South African context but the prior papers have been conducted over significantly 
different time periods and data samples, and there is therefore merit in combining all four 
approaches into a single study focused on one consistent data sample. 
In any business the financial backbone can be divided into two parts. The first part is the opportunity 
to invest in an asset that will generate economic benefits, mostly in the form of earnings. The second 
part is the funding of the investment into the economic benefit generating asset. These two parts 
are labelled in modern day finance management theory as the investing decision and the financing 
decision. These two components are also found on the balance sheet of any business, which 
indicates the investment of funds (the company’s assets), and the sources of the funds used for 
investment (its capital and debt).   
The capital structure of a company is a conscious strategic financial management decision. The 
decision comprises that management must consider how much debt and equity it wants to carry on 
its balance sheet, and to maintain in the future. This decision translates into the business’ debt-to-
equity ratio, as reflected in its balance sheet.  Management must also decide on which types of debt 
and equity it wants to take on. These decisions are directly affected by the type of financing that are 
available to management, as well as the financial policy that has been decided on. The risk profile of 
a company plays a fundamental role in determining the type of financial policy to follow, and this in 
turn affects the ability to maximise the value of the business. 
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The optimal capital structure is the point where the debt to equity ratio is so that the average cost of 
capital is at its lowest. In 1958 Modigliani and Miller published a paper in which it was argued that 
there is no optimal capital structure, and that the level of debt to equity will not have an effect on 
the average cost of capital of a business. This is because as the business increases its debt (which is a 
cheaper form of funds than equity, and hence the average cost of capital goes down) it also 
increases its financial risk. The equity holders will want a higher return for the increased risk that 
they have to take thus offsetting the reduction in the average cost of capital created by the debt 
funds. Their fundamental argument is that it is the economic benefit (earnings or profits) generating 
assets that give rise to the value of the business and not the source of the funds to acquire the 
assets. Modigliani and Miller find that the capital structure has no effect on the earnings or profits 
generated by the assets. In their model they assumed that there were no taxes, no costs associated 
with financial distress and no agency costs.  
However, including taxation as well as the costs associated with financial distress the picture 
changes drastically. When taxation is not excluded, the interest paid on the capital amount of the 
debt is deductible for taxation purposes, and this increases the earnings after taxation that is 
generated by the assets. This means that the value of the business will now be increased by the 
taxation saving created by funding the assets through debt. This causes a decrease in the cost of 
capital as the debt to equity ratio increases. As the debt funding increases so does the financial risk, 
and hence the risk of potential financial failure also increases. Modigliani and Miller’s model 
furthermore ignores the fact that earnings or profits could decline due to too much debt funding on 
the balance sheet. Other factors not incorporated into this model include potential agency costs, 
and the possibility of increased interest rates on debt due to the increased risk profile of a more 
indebted business. When taking these factors into account a much better picture of reality can be 
formed. It is shown that initially the taxation deductibility of the interest expense does increase the 
value of the business, but from a certain point the value declines again due to the costs of potential 
financial failure and distress when too much debt funding has been taken on.  
Examples in the South African context of companies that have been negatively affected by too much 
debt are Edcon and Primedia. Edcon is a fashion retailer and owns brands like Edgars and CNA. 
Edcon was bought in 2007 by private equity firm Bain Capital Partners. The firm used a leveraged 
buyout to acquire Edcon and in the process took on too much debt and as a result put Edcon under 
huge financial distress. Similarly, Primedia is a media group who also experienced financial distress 
due to taking on too much debt.  
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At this point, where the benefit of the interest deductibility is matched by the cost of too much debt 
funding, the optimal capital structure ratio is found, which leads to the pragmatic trade-off theory. 
The Trade-Off theory, (Myers 1984; Stiglitz 1974; Kane et al., 1984), stipulates that the cost of equity 
and the cost of debt will increase as the debt to equity ratio increases. Businesses are trading off the 
benefits of debt financing with the cost of taking on additional debt funding, which includes 
potential financial distress and failure, as well as higher interest rates (Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002b; Stiglitz, 1974). The average cost of capital will 
initially fall, will then remain at a constant level for a variety of capital structures, and will finally 
increase as the debt to equity ratio increases, and with it the financial risk (Myers and Shyam-
Sunder, 1999, p220). This indicates that there are a wide range of optimal capital structures available 
to the business, as long as the average cost of capital does not increase. 
In practice assets are acquired by using debt and equity funding, and thus the capital structure will 
change very slightly every time an asset is acquired. Borrowers will also not lend businesses funds 
unless there are sufficient cash flows and/or security in the form of assets on the balance sheet. In 
practice a business that has been operating for many years and is generating positive cash flows 
should have no problem in obtaining debt funding from borrowers. Again the magnitude of the debt 
funding will be determined by the risk profile of the business – in other words, how likely is the 
business to continue operating as a going concern? The Trade-Off theory thus may be able to explain 
why businesses in the real world have such varying debt to equity ratios.  
Businesses try to limit the use of debt funding in order to reduce the risk profile of the company and 
the potential of going into bankruptcy. Thus it seems likely that businesses are conscious of the fact 
that additional debt funding comes at a price.  Evidence of this is the lending practices of commercial 
banks where the banks specifically analyses financial debt ratios such as debt service cover ratios 
and interest cover ratios to help decide whether to finance potential clients. A low debt to equity 
ratio signals to the market and potential borrowers of funds that the businesses is healthy and will 
continue to be healthy for some time even if economic difficulties do arise. If the Trade-Off theory 
holds then businesses that are profitable and have low debt to equity ratios should make use of debt 
funds more often. This, however, is not always the case in the real world. Hennessy and Whited 
(2005), for example, find that profitable firms tend to be less highly leveraged, and suggests that the 
Trade-Off theory is not the whole story. Two other theories, namely the Pecking Order theory 
(Donaldson, 1961; Myers 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999) and Signalling theory (Spence, 
1973; Ross, 1977), may explain this occurrence. 
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Pecking Order theory states that there is no optimal target capital structure. Funding will be raised 
according to a set hierarchy. Firstly, funding will be generated out of the retained earnings, secondly 
from debt funding, and lastly from the issue of new equity. This hierarchy preserves two very 
important functions that management value very highly – control and flexibility. Retained earnings 
preserve existing control of the business, because borrowers can impose restrictive covenants on 
the business and issuing new equity will dilute existing shareholder control.  Flexibility is given up 
when taking on debt funding because this reduces the flexibility to raise new debt funding from 
borrowers in the future. According to the pecking order it would be expected that businesses with 
low debt to equity ratios would have strong operating cash flows and would be classified as healthy 
businesses. 
Information Asymmetry (Ross, 1977; Myers and Majluf 1984; Miller and Rock 1985; Stiglitz, 2002) 
also plays an important role when looking at the capital structure. It is obvious that internal 
managers of the business will have much more information available about the value of the business 
when compared to external investors or borrowers. Thus, managers will know when a business’s 
financial instruments (ordinary shares, debentures etc.) are over- or undervalued. It then makes 
sense that management will be reluctant to issue ordinary equity that is undervalued, as the 
objective would be to get as much value for every share that is issued. This implies that an equity 
issue may signal that a business’s shares are overvalued at a point in time (Miller and Rock, 1985; 
Asquith and Mullins, 1986). As per the Pecking Order theory it is expected that management will 
always try to use the lowest cost funding available to them. Management will firstly use internally 
generated profits and cash flows so as to keep control and flexibility as discussed above. If no 
internally generated funds are available only then will management look at external funding like 
debt or equity. Again the Pecking Order theory states that management will first look at debt 
(because it is at a lower cost than equity) and as a last option only look at equity funding. This then 
implies that business will only issue equity (for funding) in situations when they have no other option 
due to the fact that the business cannot get any debt funding due to its high debt levels (flexibility) 
(Frijins, Navissi, Rad and Tsai, 2006).  
As this research project is specifically focussed on the issue of additional equity by companies listed 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), it is important to define an equity issue. The most 
common forms of equity issues are initial public offerings (IPO), rights issues and seasoned equity 
issues (mostly in the United States of America). Initial public offerings can take the shape of one of 
two forms. The first is an offer for sale where existing shareholders in the business offer their 
existing shares for sale to the public. The second form is an offer for subscription where the business 
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(in the form of a company) invites the public to subscribe for new ordinary shares that have not yet 
been issued, in the business (Firer, Ross and Westerfield, 2012). A rights issue is where a listed 
company wants to raise more equity capital. The company makes a rights issue to its existing 
shareholders in the ratio of current shares held by the shareholders (Prabrina, Raghunathan and 
Raghunathan, 2007). In other words for every ordinary share held the shareholder receives a right to 
a new ordinary share. The existing shareholders may opt to exercise the right or may opt to not 
exercise the right and forfeit the new ordinary shares in which case their shareholding will be 
diluted. The price of the right to subscribe for the additional shares is normally at a discount to the 
prevailing market price (Lhabitant and Gregoriou, 2008).  
Another form of equity issue is a private placement of shares. A private placement of shares is where 
a small group of investors subscribe for ordinary equity. The investors that normally subscribes to 
this kind of equity issuance are institutions like big banks, mutual funds and pension funds. In 
essence a private placement is the opposite of a public placement. The reason for a rights issue also 
plays an important part as will be discussed later in the study. The rights issue could be for normal 
operational reasons such as to finance new growth projects or it could be to avoid going bankrupt as 
in the case of Lonmin that recently had to issue equity to ensure that it had enough operational cash 
flow to continue operating.   
As mentioned earlier, issuing equity could act as a signal to the market that management of the 
business perceives the ordinary shares to be overvalued. Businesses will not want to issue equity 
when their debt to equity ratios are low and they have spare capacity to take on debt, due to the 
negative signalling effect of such an action. This implies that a business will try to maintain as low a 
debt to equity ratio as possible to ensure the most flexibility (rather get debt funding which is 
cheaper than issuing equity funding).  
This raises the first question to be investigated for the JSE: what is the share market’s reaction to 
equity issued (which is more expensive than debt funding) by a business, considering the Trade-Off 
theory, Pecking Order theory and the Signalling theory? The only logical way to measure the 
market’s reaction to this signal (positive or negative) is to observe what the business’s share price 
does in reaction to this signal. In other words, does the market interpret the signal as negative (value 
destroying) in which case the share price will fall, or positive (value creative) in which case the share 
price will rise?  
The “health” of the business can be expressed as the likelihood that it will still be able to operate 
successfully even when economic times are tough. In other words, the business and financial risk is 
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low and there is no significant threat of bankruptcy in the medium term (one to three years).  A firm 
is financially constrained when it has taken on more debt than it can comfortably service, and its 
flexibility to take on additional debt funding is limited. It follows that “unhealthy” businesses only 
have the option of generating funding through equity issues (rights issues), while “healthy” 
businesses have the option of both debt and equity funding available. Thus the question arises: if 
“unhealthy” businesses are perceived as “bad” investments, how will the investors (market) react 
when an “unhealthy” business conducts an equity issue in the form of a rights issue, taking in 
consideration that this is the only funding option available to the “unhealthy” business because it 
already has too much debt on its balance sheet? This represents the second area of research applied 
to the JSE that is described in this document.  
In other words is the share price of the issuing “unhealthy” business punished for the equity issue? 
Vice versa, how do investors (market) react when a “healthy” business issues equity in the form of a 
rights issue, considering that the “healthy” business can opt for the cheaper debt funding instead? 
This study will investigate the impact of the “financial health” of a business on the reaction of its 
share price to an equity issue. 
A further area that this study will investigate is the share price reaction to an equity issue in the 
context of the reasons given for it by management. Specifically, a comparative investigation of the 
share price reaction to equity issues aimed at repaying debt versus equity issues conducted with a 
view to investments will be performed. These two categories of equity issue will further be 
considered in the context of financially constrained and financially non-constrained companies, 
respectively.  As far as I am aware, this type of investigation into the reasons provided by 
management has only been done once by Setati, (2012) in the South African context and this 
presents a case for further study in this area especially considering the world wide recovery after the 
global economic crisis of 2009/2010.  
The final area of interest for this study is the question whether there is an element of market timing 
present when businesses decide to obtain funding by way of equity issues. The Market Timing 
theory assumes that through information asymmetry management is aware when the financial 
instruments of the business are mispriced. This theory implies that management will try to time the 
market and issue equity when the market price of the ordinary shares is high, and repurchase equity 
when the market price of the ordinary shares is low. Recent studies have shown that management in 
their corporate finance policy considers the timing of equity issues and repurchases, as well as debt 
issues. Indeed Graham and Harvey (2001) did not find much support for the Trade-off and Pecking 
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order theories, and instead revealed that management try and time the market when issuing and 
repurchasing equity.  
The remainder of this study will be divided into four sections, namely the literature review and 
hypothesis development section, data and methodology section, the results and analysis section, 




Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
When analysing capital structure, the seminal theory is the irrelevance of capital structure theory of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), wherein these authors argued that there is no optimal capital 
structure, and that in a frictionless capital market the value of a business is not dependent on how it 
finances its operations or assets. As mentioned before they ignored taxes, transaction costs, agency 
costs and costs associated with financial distress. Later a tax adjusted Modigliani and Miller theory 
was developed, wherein the tax deductibility of the interest expense of debt funding was 
acknowledged (Modigliani and Miller, 1963).   
Over the years various other capital theories were developed to add to Modigliani and Miller’s 
effort. Amongst the theories developed in this regard that are relevant to this study, include the 
Trade-off theory and the Pecking Order theory.  
2.1 Trade-Off Theory 
The Trade-off theory, was developed by Myers in 1984, and postulated that businesses trade-off the 
benefits of the tax deductibility of the interest expense of debt funding against the potential cost of 
having too much debt on the balance sheet, such as higher interest rates and potential bankruptcy 
(Fama and French, 2005). This is in line with the tax-adjusted Modigliani and Miller theory. Evidence 
against the Trade-Off Theory have been found by Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), amongst others. These authors found that contrary to the Trade-off theory, businesses that 
were highly profitable did not have high debt to equity ratios. Titman and Wessels studied the 
period 1974 to 1988 and had a sample of 469 companies. Rajan and Zingales (1995) studied the 
period 1987 to 1991 and had a sample of 2 583 companies. When a business generates high 
operating cash flows and is profitable, trade-off theory expects that it will try to reduce its tax 
liability. The tax liability can be reduced by using debt funding (due to the tax deductibility of the 
interest expense), rather than equity funding. The risk profile of the business also plays an important 
part when looking at the Trade-off theory. Marsh (1982) found that when the financial risk of a 
business is high, the probability of failure and bankruptcy is higher, and thus a business in such a 
position will rather prefer to issue equity to reduce the financial risk. Marsh’s study focused on 
United Kingdom companies for the period 1959 to 1974. 
Studies that support the Trade-off theory includes those of Marsh (1982), (Hovakimian, Opler and 
Titman (1999) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003). Hovakim, Opler and Titman (1999) and Korajczyk and 
Levy (2003) approaches were similar in the sense that they looked at the relation between firm-
specific variables, target leverage and issue choice. Korajczyk and Levy, however, split their sample 
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into financially constrained and financially unconstrained companies similar to this study. These 
studies all found that targeted debt to equity ratios does play a role when financial securities are 
issued and repurchased. Leary and Roberts (2004) found that businesses do not actively implement 
their financial policy in general, but try to move in line with a targeted optimal capital structure by 
issuing and buying back equity. Research by Myers and Lakshmi ( 1999), however, found that 
businesses do consider the trade-off benefit of the tax deductibility of the interest expense from the 
debt funding, as well as business size and the types of assets that the business owns, when deciding 
on a target capital structure. It seems that in the real world debt and equity levels on the balance 
sheets of businesses do change over time, and that it varies from any specific targeted optimal 
capital structure. It also seems plausible that when the debt-to-equity ratio differs substantially from 
the targeted optimal capital structure, that the management will either issue or repurchase equity to 
align the ratio back to the target. Myers and Lakshmi (1999) find that changes in capital structure 
could be as a result of the need for funding, rather than trying to achieve a targeted optimal capital 
structure. Thus, it seems that the trade-off theory does not fully explain empirical observation, and 
there is therefore a need for further capital structure theories. 
2.2 Pecking Order Theory 
The Pecking Order Theory was developed by Myers in 1984, and further extended by Myers and 
Majluf (1984). This theory is based on the premise, in line with Modigliani and Miller, that there is no 
optimal capital structure, and that funding will be raised according to a preferred hierarchy. The 
theory implies that funding behaviour is determined by the adverse selection costs of retained 
earnings, debt and equity. According to Frank and Goyal ( 2002), retained earnings has no adverse 
selection problems, debt has more adverse selection problems due to financial risk, and equity has 
the most adverse selection problems as it is both expensive and  results in reduced control.  These 
authors find that an outside investor views equity as riskier than debt, and that both have an 
adverse selection risk premium, but that the premium on equity is much higher than that on debt, 
the equity premium being the cost of capital required for the risk taken by the ordinary shareholder. 
Shyam-Sunder and Meyers ( 1999) found that when funding is needed by businesses, they prefer 
debt funding over equity funding due to the lower information costs associated with debt funding, 
and that equity is only issued as a last resort.  
Shyam-Sunder and Meyers (1999) further found strong support for the Pecking Order theory in a 
sample of 157 publicly traded companies in the United States of America over the period 1971 to 
1989. Myers (2001) reports that in the United States of America equity issues play a relatively minor 
role, and that the bulk of funding that is generated comes from debt funding. The Pecking Order 
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theory predicts that businesses with high growth rates and large funding needs will have high debt-
to-equity ratios because management will be reluctant to issue equity. Smith and Watts (1992) and 
Barclay (2001) found exactly the opposite. Smith and Watts (1992) focused on data between 1965 to 
1985, while Barclay (2001) focused on companies in the United States industrial corporate sector for 
the period 1950 to 1999 and had 9 037 companies in its sample. They found that high growth 
businesses use less debt in their capital structures, and more equity.  As mentioned earlier, the 
Trade-off theory predicts that profitable businesses should have higher debt-to-equity ratios. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) and Fama and French (2002), however, find a negative correlation between 
profitability and debt-to-equity ratios. This is in line with the Pecking Order theory. Titman and 
Wessels studied the period 1974 to 1988 and had a sample of 469 companies.  Fama and French 
(2005) subsequently contradicted their own 2002 results by finding empirical evidence against the 
pecking order. Specifically, they found that businesses issued and repurchased equity at a faster rate 
than what the Pecking Order theory implied. All three of these elements needs to be considered 
when looking at the capital structure, as they all appear to influence the decision between using 
debt or equity funding in the capital structure. Another factor that influences this decision is the 
information asymmetry between management and the suppliers of funds (investors and borrowers) 
as well as the signalling effect of either form of funding.     
2.3 Information Asymmetry 
Stiglitz (2002) explained that information asymmetries will occur when “different people know 
different things”. This implies that there is an information gap between the individuals that have the 
information and the individuals that do not have the information. Connelly, Certo, Ireland and 
Reutzel (2011) indicate that “because some information is private, information asymmetries can 
arise between those who hold the information and those who could potentially make a better 
informed decision if they had the information”. Stiglitz (2000) found that markets with minor 
information imperfections would behave more or less the same as markets with perfect information. 
According to Stiglitz (2000), there are two types of information where asymmetry is important: 
information about quality and information about intent.  The second type is where one party is 
concerned about the behaviour of another party, or the intentions of the behaviour of the party. 
Information Asymmetry Theory is related to two capital structure theories that are relevant to this 
study, and which are discussed in the next two sections, namely Market Timing Theory, and 





2.4 Market Timing Theory 
Market Timing Theory suggests that the management of businesses try to issue equity when the 
equity is perceived to be overvalued, and repurchase equity when the equity is perceived to be 
undervalued (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Asquith and Mullins (1986), Jung et al (1996) and 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) all found that management issues equity when the market 
prices of the equity are perceived to be high. Empirical evidence by Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
supports the Market Timing Theory and found that management issued equity when the share price 
was high compared to historical share prices, and preferred to repurchase equity when the share 
price was low compared to historical share prices. Baker and Wurgler (2002) also found that 
management issued equity when the equity premium (cost of equity) was low, and repurchased 
equity when the equity premium was high. Jung et al. (1996) find that equity issuers have higher 
market-to-book ratios and experience higher share price run-ups prior to the announcement of a 
rights issue than debt issuers.  DeAngelo et al., (2010) find that while equity issuers have higher 
valuations as measured by the market-to-book ratio, the high valuation only has a small effect on 
the decision to issue equity when compared to the short-term cash needs of the business. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) further investigated how market timing affected the business capital structure by 
using the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the business’s valuation.  Dong, Loncarski, Horst and 
Veld, (2012), in a paper that analysed the effects of market timing and the pecking order, examined 
the market-to-book-ratios of Canadian businesses from 1998 to 2007, and reported that companies 
that repurchased shares had the lowest market-to-book ratios (2.041 – cheap) and share issuers had 
the highest (5.3 – expensive). Dong, Loncarski, Horst and Veld, (2012) also found that the effect of 
market timing on the equity issuance was conditional on the degree of financial constraints that the 
business is facing at the time of issuing the equity. In other words, these authors find that market 
timing is only feasible when businesses are less financially constrained. Using the KZ-index 
developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and applied by others, such as Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 
(2003) and Chang, Tam, Tan and Wong, (2007), Dong, Loncarski, Horst and Veld, (2012) tested 
market timing in the Canadian market by investigating the correlation between the share price 
abnormal returns and the market-to-book ratio. Barberis and Huang, (2001) and, Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam, (2001), argue that market-to-book ratio can measure under/over valuation of a 
business, and the latter was therefore chosen as a proxy for the business’ valuation. Dong, Loncarski, 
Horst and Veld (2012) find that, in a sample of equity and debt issuers, only when businesses are not 
financially constrained is there evidence that they issue equity when their shares are overvalued. 
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However, evidence is also found that overvalued issuers earn lower post-announcement abnormal 
share price returns. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) confirm the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002) when they conducted a 
survey of 392 chief financial officers, who reported that share prices are a very important factor 
considered when management decide whether to issue equity or to repurchase equity in the 
market. As is evident in the literature provided above, there is clear evidence that management try 
to time the market when issuing new equity. Baker and Wurgler (2002) also found that market 
timing was better executed by businesses with low debt-to-equity ratios than businesses with high 
debt-to-equity ratios. This implies that businesses with low debt levels can raise equity whenever 
they want to, and at times that suits them. Businesses with high leverage do not have this luxury, 
and are often forced to raise equity in times when the share price is low compared to historical 
share prices, as well as when economic times are difficult. This could be to their detriment. Rights 
issues can also be used for positive signals to the market such as acquisitions of new businesses to 
further secure future growth for the business. A recent example in the South African context was 
Woolworths that issued equity in the form of a rights issue to acquire David Jones an Australian 
company. This event was also part of the original events sample.   
2.5 Signalling Theory 
Signalling Theory states that signallers are insiders (typically the management of the business) who 
have information about the business (Ross, 1977) that is not publicly available to outsiders 
(investors, lenders, and the financial market in general). The information that management have can 
be positive or negative (Connelly, Trevis, Certo, Duane, Ireland and Reutzel, 2011), and management 
have the power to decide whether they want to communicate the information to the outsiders 
through their actions. This is known as the signal. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Asquith and Mullins 
(1986) find that issuing new equity (ordinary shares) of the business is generally considered a 
negative signal, because management may issue equity when they perceive that the share price 
(equity of the business) is overvalued. Different corporate actions such as issuing of equity (rights 
issues) and repurchase of equity can be interpreted as negative and positive signals to outsiders. 
Ross (1973) and Bhattacharya (1979) found that business debt and dividends signalled quality of 
business to the market. Their models found that only high quality businesses could pay interest on 
debt funding and dividends on equity funding in the long-term, and that low quality businesses 
would not be able to do the same. This had the effect that the providers of funding (the investors 
and borrowers) looked at these qualities to establish what businesses were quality investments, and 
which were not. Similarly, Spiess and Affleck-Graves, (1995) conducted a study on a sample of 1 247 
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company equity rights issue events in the United States over the period 1975 to 1989, that by finding 
a 60 month negative cumulative abnormal return of 31.24% confirm the negative signalling effect of 
rights issues. Following these theories it seems that the Trade-Off theory and the Pecking Order 
theory should be applied together with the financial “health” of the business. 
The following section will discuss South African evidence on rights issues in more detail. 
2.6 South African Evidence 
A study that supported the idea that an equity issue (rights issue) is seen as a negative signal was 
performed in the South African context by Bhana, (1999), who reports an average share price 
decline of 3.51%, over a two day announcement period for a sample of companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) over the period 1980 to 1995. In a subsequent study of equity 
rights issues on the JSE for the period 1989 to 2002, Pascoe, Ward and MacKenzie, (2005) found a 
statistically significant decline of 3.8% in the share prices over an event window of twenty days. 
More recently Cotterel (2011) performed a similar study of equity rights issues on the JSE for the 
period 2001 to 2010, and reported a statistically significant share price decline of 3.2% over an event 
window of 20 days. All three of the above studies, therefore, find very similar results, all supporting 
signalling theory.  
Setati (2012), however, performed an event study on the JSE using a much longer event window of 
73 days. Conducted for the period 2002 to 2011, this study reported a statistically significant share 
price decline of 12.79%. The sample was furthermore classified according to the reasons advanced 
for the rights issues, being debt repayment, general and investment. The following statistically 
significant results were reported for the various categories: a decline of 10.17% over a post-event 
window of 28 days for the debt repayment sample, a decline of 24.82% over a post-event window of 
31 for the general sample, and a decline of 16.89% over a post-event window of 68 days.  
Cotterel (2011), on the basis of the market viewing rights issues by financially constrained companies 
differently to financially healthy companies, classified his sample according to the Altman Z-score 
bankruptcy prediction model (used as a proxy for financial distress) into two groups, namely 
“healthy”, and “grey zone/unhealthy”. For the “healthy” group a statistically significant decline of 
0.28% over a post-event period of 20 days was found, in contrast to a statistically significant decline 





2.7 Problem Statement and Hypotheses 
As mentioned earlier, the literature on Optimal Capital Structure Theory, Trade-off Theory, Pecking 
Order Theory, Information Asymmetry Theory, Signalling Theory and the financial health of a 
business, all within of equity rights issues, suggest an interesting area of research. As the literature 
reports, equity issues are perceived as negative signalling events, and the equity market (investors) 
can be expected react negatively to this signal, resulting in a declining share price. 
Questions that arise in this context include:  
1. How do suppliers of equity react to an equity issuing event (rights issue), that presumably sends 
out a negative signal by the management of the business?  
2. Does the financial health of a business issuing equity play a role in the reaction by the providers 
of equity? In other words will the share price decline for a business classified by the Altman Z-
score as healthy, be less than for a business that is financially constrained?  
3. Can the management of the business that sends out the negative signal try and manage the 
reaction by the outsiders (the market) by actively providing a valid reason for the equity that is 
being issued? In other words if management reports that the proceeds of the rights issue (equity 
issue) will be used for investing purposes, will that business’ share price decline by less than for a 
business that reports that the proceeds will be used to repay outstanding debt”? 
4. Is there an element of market timing present when management issues equity in the form of 
rights issues? In other words, can management time the equity market by issuing equity when 
the share prices are at a high level compared to the value of the business issuing the equity?  
It is these questions that this study will attempt to investigate and answer. Out of the above 
questions, the following hypotheses have been developed to form the basis of this study:  
Hypothesis One: 
The null hypothesis states that rights offers do not affect cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) in share price performance. As indicated by the literature review, the alternative 
hypotheses states that rights issues negatively affect cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR’s).  
The following equation represents this: 
H0: CAAR = 0        Equation 1 
Ha: CAAR <0        Equation 2 
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This hypothesis follows the rationale as formulated by Pascoe, Ward and Mackenzie (2005), which 
seeks to confirm the negative share price response to the rights issues in the selected period. The 
expected finding is that there will be a negative share price reaction similar to that found in previous 
studies. 
Hypothesis Two: 
The null hypothesis states that the financial position of a business making a rights issue, as measured 
by the Altman Z-score, will have no impact on the nature of its post-issue abnormal share price 
returns. The alternative hypothesis states that the financial position of the issuer will affect the 
nature of the abnormal share price returns post the rights issue. The following equation represents 
this: 
H0: CAAR(financially healthy) = CAAR(financially unhealthy)  Equation 3 
Ha: CAAR(financially healthy ) ≠ CAAR(financially unhealthy)  Equation 4 
There is very little literature available on the impact of an equity issuers’ financial position (health) 
on the nature of its post-issue abnormal share price returns. Dong, Loncarski, Horst and Veld, 2012 
find that when businesses are not financially constrained , there is evidence that they issue equity 
when their shares are overvalued, and  also evidence that overvalued issuers earn lower abnormal 
post-announcement share returns. Various arguments can be made in this regard. The first is that if 
a business is financially distressed and decides to execute a rights issue, the market may see this as a 
positive step in order for the business to remain viable, especially if the company’s financial distress 
is well-known and already priced into its share price. An alternative argument could be that by 
sending out the negative signal of an equity issue, the business could further communicate to the 
market that it is in a desperate situation, and that this last desperate corporate action could possibly 
only be postponing the inevitable. Thus the market would react even more negatively to the rights 
issue and the share price would decline even more drastically. 
On the other hand, if a business is financially healthy, an argument could be made that the business 
has sufficient flexibility available to be able to rather use cheaper debt funding, or preferably (based 
on the Pecking Order theory), internal funds (retained earnings), instead of  more risky and 
expensive equity funding. Thus the market could react negatively to a rights issue, either as a 
negative signal that the business is not as financially strong as previously thought, or because of the 





The null hypothesis states that the post-issue abnormal share price returns will not be affected by 
whether a business indicates that the intended use of the proceeds of a rights issue is to repay debt, 
or to invest (including in growth opportunities). The alternative hypothesis states that whether a 
business reports that it will use the proceeds of a rights issue to repay debt or for investment 
purposes, will affect the nature of the abnormal share price returns post the rights issue. The 
following equation represents this: 
H0: CAAR(debt repayment) = CAAR(investment)    Equation 5 
Ha: CAAR(debt repayment) ≠ CAAR(investment)    Equation 6 
Again, as in the case of hypothesis two, very little literature is available linking the market’s reaction 
to equity issuance with the reason provided by an issuer. A couple of arguments can be made out of 
the theory discussed above. The first is that if the issuer reports that the proceeds will be used to 
repay debt, the market will interpret the rights issue as negative signalling, as discussed under the 
reported literature. The rights issue will be considered even more negative due to the fact that less 
risky and cheaper debt funding is replaced by riskier and more expensive equity funding on the 
balance sheet. By decreasing the debt-to-equity ratio the average cost of capital will increase by the 
additional risk premium added, due to the new equity in the capital structure. By issuing equity in 
the place of debt, the control of the business will be diluted, and the existing shareholders will be 
affected negatively. A counterargument is that by replacing debt funding with equity funding the 
financial risk of the business will decline, which could be interpreted by the market as a positive 
development. 
If the issuer reports that the proceeds will be used for investment purposes, the market could see 
this as a positive signal that the company intends exploiting growth opportunities that will benefit 
shareholders in future.   
Hypothesis Four: 
The Market Timing theory implies that businesses should issue equity when the equity is overvalued 
and that if the Market Timing theory holds, equity valuation should negatively predict 
announcement abnormal share price returns. Furthermore, businesses can only practice market 
timing when they are not financially constrained (Dong, Loncarski, Horst and Veld, 2012). This 
reasoning leads to the following hypothesis regarding the correlation between the post-
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announcement abnormal share price returns, the market-to-book ratio, and the degree of financial 
constraint of the business issuing the equity. 
Hypothesis four: Post-announcement abnormal share price returns should be negatively correlated 
to the market-to-book ratio, and degree of financial constraint faced by the business issuing the 
equity. 






Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
In this chapter the data that was used for this study will be described, as well as the methodology 
employed.  In order to establish what the effect of the rights issue (equity issue) is on the share price 
of the business issuing, the best approach is to study the share price reaction around the rights 
issuing event date. It thus follows that this study will apply an event study methodology, with the 
rights issue being the event that will be studied.  
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
The data used for this study comprised the following elements: 
 Daily total returns (in other words, inclusive of both dividends and share price returns) were 
obtained from individual share’s total return indices sourced from Datastream.  
 Share prices were obtained from the I-Net BFA Macgregor. 
 Total return index data for the JSE Mining index, Financial-Industrial index, All Share Index and 
the R157/R186 government bonds were obtained from Datastream. 
 SENS announcements from which rights issue events were identified were obtained from the 
Sharedata website 
 Market capitalisations were obtained from I-Net BFA Macgregor, and confirmed by being 
calculated manually by multiplying the outstanding shares with the market price on the JSE. 
 Annual financial statements for businesses involved in the rights issue events were obtained 
from the corporate websites of the relevant businesses. This was needed to obtain the inputs for 
the Altman Z-score calculation for every event’s business. The inputs that was obtained from the 
annual financial statements were; working capital (inventory, trade and other receivables, trade 
and other payables); retained earnings; total liabilities; capital expenditure; book value of equity; 
total assets; earnings before interest and taxation; sales.   
This study focuses on equity rights issues performed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange from 
January 2009 to the end of December 2014. The event day is specifically defined as the date on 
which the rights issue was announced to the public. The first step was therefore to determine the 
selection criteria for equity issue events to be included in the sample of study. 
Rights issues had to satisfy the following selection criteria, which are similar to those adopted by 




 The shares issued had to be ordinary shares. Issues of other listed instruments such as 
preference shares, debentures and linked units (used by South African listed Property Funds) 
were excluded from the sample. 
 The issued shares had to be ZAR denominated. 
 Companies had to be listed on the JSE. 
 Rights issues had to be in shares of the listed company. Therefore, rights issues of shares in 
other companies, such as the holding company or subsidiary company, were excluded. 
 Rights issues had to be made for ordinary shares held prior to the rights issue. Rights issues for 
preference shares held or convertible instruments held were excluded. 
 The rights issues had not to be issued for the purposes of Black Economic Empowerment. Issues 
for Black Economic Empowerment purposes were excluded from the sample. 
 Rights issues had not to be issued for the purpose of a script dividend to replace a cash dividend. 
 No confounding events had to occur simultaneously to the rights issue. Confounding events for 
example were mergers and/or acquisitions, simultaneous announcement of annual financial 
statements and simultaneous issuing of another instrument etc. 
 Rights issues had to be for companies that had been listed for at least 340 trading days before 
the rights issue event day (the announcement of the rights issue day) and at least 60 days after 
this date. 
 The rights issue had to be for more than R100 million Rand. This would ensure that only 
companies with large market capitalisation and highly liquid shares were included in the sample. 
In addition to the above criteria, when companies had more than one rights issue in the sample 
period, only the most recent rights issue by date was included. Initially there were 72 rights issues 
that occurred from January 2009 to December 2014. Eleven events were excluded due to more than 
one rights issue occurring during the sample period, fifteen events were excluded due to them being 
property income funds, six were excluded due to lack of data, five events were excluded due to 
illiquidity and issue size being less than R100 million, four events were excluded due to the annual 
financial statements being released on the announcement day, and six events were excluded due to 
confounding events, such as acquisitions and sale of material assets, occurring on the 
announcement day. After applying the above criteria, there therefore remained twenty-five events 
in the final sample. Although this is a small sample in comparison to the other South African studies, 
(Bartholdy et al, 2007) has demonstrated that as few as 20 events is sufficient to establish 
significance in results, even in thinly-traded markets. In Table 1 below, the full original sample of 
companies issuing rights issues from January 2009 to December 2014 can be seen, as well as the 
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reasons for exclusions from the final sample. The events shaded in grey were excluded from the 
event sample.  
Table 1: The full initial rights issue sample 
 
1 Ellies Holdings Ltd ELI 06-Oct-14 4 950 000 000                  
2 Woolworths Holdings Ltd WHL 29-Aug-14 10 000 000 000               Confounding event: acquisition David Jones
3 Putprop Ltd PPR 06-Feb-14 100 039 703                     
4 Oando Plc OAO 02-Dec-14 2 913 042 999                  Confounding event: acquisition Conoco Phillips Nigeria
5 Invicta Holdings Ltd IVT 10-Nov-14 2 250 000 000                  
6 Ellies Holdings Ltd ELI 06-Oct-14 49 500 000                       Subsequent rights issue(s) made
7 Investec Australia Property Fund IAP 18-Sep-14 1 197 290 389                  Issue of linked unit
8 Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd SHF 02-Jul-14 18 200 000 000               
9 Curro Holdings Ltd COH 18-Feb-14 589 594 780                     
10 Fortress Income Fund FFA 09-May-14 609 604 196                     Issue of linked unit
11 Fortress Income Fund FFB 09-May-14 390 322 111                     Issue of linked unit
12 Resilient Poperty Income fund RES 14-Apr-14 999 999 988                     Issue of linked unit
13 Aquarius Platinum Ltd AQP 07-Apr-14 2 352 658 643                  
14 Into Properties Plc ITU * * No SENS data available
15 Seardel Investment Corporation Ltd SER * * No SENS data available
16 Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd RBP 04-Mar-14 800 000 025                     
17 Efficient Group Ltd EFG 05-Mar-14 28 000 000                       Confounding event: acquisition Verso
18 Sacoil Holdings Ltd SCL 07-Nov-13 336 582 418                     
19 Jasco Ltd JSC 05-Dec-13 57 600 000                       Issue value to low
20 Northam Platinum Ltd NHM 20-Sep-13 600 000 000                     
21 Vunani Property Investment Fund VPF * * No SENS data available
22 New Europe Property Investment Fund NEP 13-Jun-13 1 349 999 654                  Issue of linked unit
23 Sycom Property Fund SYC 28-Mar-13 900 000 002                     Issue of linked unit
24 Curro Holdings Ltd COH 22-Feb-13 605 879 376                     Subsequent rights issue(s) made
25 Delta Property Fund Ltd DLT 28-Feb-13 1 000 000 000                  Issue of linked unit
26 Rainbow Chicken Ltd RBW * * Confounding event: AFS released simultaneously
27 Rebosis Property Fund Ltd REB 18-Dec-12 650 000 000                     Issue of linked unit
28 Oando Plc OAO 21-Dec-12 2 941 799 223                  Subsequent rights issue(s) made
29 Pan African Resources Plc PAN 07-Nov-12 703 000 000                     Confounding event: acquisition Evander
30 Lonmin Plc LON 09-Nov-12 7 122 635 206                  
31 New Europe Property Investment Fund NEP 21-Sep-12 - Issue of linked unit
32 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd CPI 26-Sep-12 2 248 000 000                  
33 Investec Property Fund Ltd IPF 27-Aug-12 1 560 000 000                  Issue of linked unit
34 Mediclinic International MDC 01-Aug-12 5 000 000 000                  
35 Pallinghurst Resources Ltd PGL 11-Jun-12 800 000 000                     
36 Octodec Investments Ltd OCT 11-Jul-12 300 000 000                     
37 Hospitality Property Fund HPA 28-Mar-12 413 280 000                     Issue of linked unit
38 Hospitality Property Fund HPB 28-Mar-12 117 000 000                     Issue of linked unit
39 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd MUR 29-Feb-12 2 000 000 000                  
40 Finbond Group Ltd FGL 09-Dec-11 20 000 000                       Issue value to low
41 New Europe Property Investment Fund NEP 21-Oct-11 428 571 420                     Issue of linked unit
42 Curro Holdings Ltd COH 26-May-11 322 428 160                     Subsequent rights issue(s) made
43 Brait Ltd BAT 02-Mar-11 5 900 000 000                  Confounding event: acquisition Pep Ltd
44 Tradehold Ltd TDH 09-Mar-11 650 000 000                     
45 Sovereign Food Investments Ltd SOV 21-Oct-10 150 000 000                     
46 Esorfranki Ltd ESR 25-Nov-10 200 000 000                     
47 Digicore Holdings Ltd DGC 16-Nov-10 90 000 000                       
48 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd CPI 25-Nov-10 1 050 000 000                  Subsequent rights issue(s) made
49 New Europe Property Investment Fund NEP 21-Sep-10 390 000 000                     Issue of linked unit
50 Buildmax Ltd BDM 24-May-10 300 502 033                     Confounding event: AFS released simultaneously
51 Hospitality Property Fund HPA 18-Aug-10 269 184 550                     Issue of linked unit
52 Hospitality Property Fund HPB 18-Aug-10 220 815 452                     Issue of linked unit
53 Omnia Holdings OMN 20-May-10 1 000 000 000                  
54 Mediclinic International MDC 21-Jun-10 1 400 000 000                  Subsequent rights issue(s) made
55 Eqstra Holdings Ltd EQS 19-Apr-10 650 000 001                     
56 Hulamin Ltd HLM 26-Apr-10 750 000 000                     
57 Ellies Holdings Ltd ELI 25-Feb-10 100 000 000                     Subsequent rights issue(s) made
58 Anglo Platinum Ltd AMS 08-Feb-10 12 500 000 000               Confounding event: AFS released simultaneously
59 Rockwell Diamonds Inc RDI 03-Feb-10 23 450 000                       Issue value to low
60 Oando Plc OAO 19-Jan-10 997 848 227                     Subsequent rights issue(s) made
61 Tawana Resources NL TAW 08-Dec-09 9 443 944                          Issue value to low
62 Distribution and Warehousing Network Ltd DAW 21-Oct-09 299 999 995                     
63 Sentula Mining SNU 06-Oct-09 501 920 340                     Confounding event: sale of mine
64 Sovereign Food Investments Ltd SOV 20-Oct-09 144 475 000                     Subsequent rights issue(s) made
65 York Timber Holdings Ltd YRK 30-Sep-09 500 000 000                     Confounding event: AFS released simultaneously
66 Super Group Ltd SPG 18-Mar-09 1 000 000 000                  
67 Pallinghurst Resources Ltd PGL 11-Aug-09 800 000 000                     Subsequent rights issue(s) made
68 Illovu Ltd ILV 26-May-09 3 000 000 087                  Confounding event: AFS released simultaneously
69 Lonmin Plc LON 11-May-09 3 964 553 462                  Subsequent rights issue(s) made
70 Zeder Investments Ltd ZED 26-Mar-09 500 000 000                     
71 Liberty International Plc LBT * * No SENS data available
72 Aquarius Platinum Ltd AQP 26-Mar-09 733 403 900                     Subsequent rights issue(s) made
* No announcement date or nominal rights issue value was available.





This study is based on an event study approach. The first published event study was that of Dolley 
(1933). Hundreds of event studies were subsequently performed, with some of the well-known early 
ones being those of Myers and Bakay (1948), Barker (1956) and Ashley (1962).  Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll’s (1969) paper was the first real introduction of modern event study methodology. Event 
study methodology has become the standard method of measuring the share price reaction to some 
announcement or event (Binder, 1998), and has been used mainly to test the null hypothesis that 
the market efficiently incorporates all available information (Fama, 1991) and, under the assumption 
of the market efficiency hypothesis, to investigate the effect of an event on a business’s share price 
(Fama, 1991). Event studies have been used to study events such as mergers and acquisitions, 
earnings announcements and the issue of debt and equity (MacKinlay, 1997). The procedure of the 
event study that was applied in this study, and the data on which it was applied, will be discussed in 
the following sections. 
The event window for this study was chosen as 60 days before the announcement day, and 60 days 
after the announcement day. A three-day announcement period will also be investigated to see the 
short term reaction of the market on the announcement of the rights issue event. By investigating 
two months before and after the announcement day of the rights issue, both the long-term and the 
short-term market reaction will be observed, and for comparative purposes this is in accordance 
with the study of Dong, Loncarski, Horst and Veld (2012), on which this study is in part based. A too 
short observation period could lead to missed observations and a too long period could factor in 
other market movements not related to the rights issue. 
3.2.1 Part 1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Rights Issues  
The first step, as per the traditional events study methodology as developed by Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll (1969), involves calculating the cumulative average abnormal returns (the “CAAR’s”), of 
each of the companies’ shares in the selected sample with respect to the rights issue events.  
This process normally has three steps. The first step is to calculate the daily abnormal returns (the 
“AR’s”) for each of the companies in the sample for every day in the event window. As mentioned 
earlier the event window stretched from 60 days before the event day (the announcement day) to 
60 days after the event day. To do this the daily total returns (including dividends) of all the 
companies in the sample had to be obtained. This data was obtained from the I-NET BF McGregor 
data base for each company in the sample. The next consideration is to calculate the abnormal 
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return and to decide on an “expected return” also called a “benchmark return”. There are various 
benchmark return models available and the following models have been developed over the years to 
calculate abnormal returns: 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM-model) can also be used to determine the expected return.  
The model is as follows: 
ARit = Rit – Rft – βi[ (Rmt –Rft)]   …………………………………………………………………..Equation 7 
Where 
 βi is the slope that is derived when regressing  (R1it – R1ft) on (Rmt – Rft) for a period not in the 
event window called the estimation period. The regression has a y-intercept of zero. 
 Rft is the risk free rate during period t. 
In this study the CAPM-model was used in conjunction with the Arbitrage Pricing Theory model (APT-
model) to determine an expected return. The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) was developed mainly 
by Ross in 1976.  The APT-model is a one period model in which every investor believes that the 
stochastic properties of returns of capital assets will be consistent with a factor structure (Huberman 
and Wang, 2005). The APT-model can be seen as a substitute for the CAPM-model. The main 
difference between the CAPM and the APT models is that the APT-model allows more than just one 
generating factor (Roll and Ross, 1980). Secondly, according to Roll and Ross, 1980 the APT-model 
demonstrates that market equilibrium is consistent with no arbitrage profits, every equilibrium will 
be characterised by a linear relationship between each asset’s expected return, and its return’s 
response amplitudes on the common factors. The CAPM-model is derived from a market equilibrium 
argument and the APT-model is derived from an arbitrage argument. Put very simply, the APT-model 
reports that the return of a risky asset (such as a share) is a linear function of a number of 
macroeconomic and financial factors and that the value of the factors change over time (Dynamic 
Portfolio Theory and Management Handbook, 2003).  
The APT-model can be formulated as follows: 
E(rj) = rf + βj1Rmt1 + βj2Rmt2 + ….. βjnRmtn   ……………………………………………………………………………………..Equation 8 
Where  
 E(rj) is the expected return of security j. 
 Rf is the risk free rate. 
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 Βj1 is the sensitivity of the jth asset to the factor 1, this is also called factor loading. 
 Rmt is the risk premium of factor 1. 
This can be stated as the expected return of an asset j is a near function of the asset’s sensitivities to 
the n factors. 
The benchmark to be used to calculate the abnormal returns will be the FTSE/JSE All share index 
(ALSI).  Van Rensburg (2002) found that a dichotomy exists in the South African market, and 
specifically that the Financial-Industrial (FINDI) and Resources/Mining indices (MINING) are the best 
proxies for the South African market. The latter study was focussed on applying the appropriate 
market proxy for beta estimation when calculating the fair values of securities, and concluded that 
the two above indices most closely represents the South African market.  Therefore, 
predicted/expected returns were modelled using both the conventional CAPM, as well as an APT 
model incorporating the JSE FINDI (J250) and the JSE Mining Index (J258) as factors. 
The factors used in the CAPM-model and the APT-model to determine the expected returns of each 
share over the event window as well as the sample period were the following: 
 The total return for the JSE all share index (code: J203) for the event period being 60 days prior 
to the rights issue and 60 days after the rights issue, as well as a sample period being 220 trading 
days before the event day. 
 The total return for the financial-industrial index (code: J250) (FINDI) for the event window and 
the sample period. 
 The total return for the mining index (code: J258) (MINING) for the event window and the 
sample period. 
 The total return for the R157/R186 South African Government bond (code: R157/R186) over the 
event window and the sample period. 
All the data was then processed through an Excel CAPM-model, as well as an excel APT-model. The 
Excel CAPM-model and APT-model then predicted what the return on the companies share prices in 
normal conditions should be. The daily abnormal returns could then be calculated by taking the 
difference in the daily returns of the companies share prices and deducting it from the expected 
daily returns as calculated by the CAPM and APT-models. The following formula was used: 




 ARit is the daily abnormal return of share i for the period t 
 Rit is the expected return for share i for the period t 
The second step is to calculate the average abnormal return (“AAR”) for each day in the event 
window. This calculates the average of the abnormal returns of all the shares in the sample for each 
day over the event window. This helps eliminate idiosyncrasies in the measurement due to 
individual shares. The formula used is as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 1/𝑁 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡   𝑁𝑖=1 ……………………………………………………………………………Equation 10 
The third step is to calculate the cumulative average abnormal return (“CAAR”). This is the sum of all 
the AAR’s over the event window. The formula used is as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡   𝑇𝑡=1 ………………………………………………………………………………Equation 11 
In order to determine the statistical significance of the results obtained from the event study, a 
paired two samples for means test was used in order to calculate a t-stat and the accompanying p-
value. 
3.2.2 Part 2: Testing the Impact of Financial Health on Market Reaction to Rights Issues  
After the AAR’s and the CAAR’s were calculated, the next step was to investigate what impact the 
financial health of the business would have on the post rights issue share returns of the businesses 
performing rights issues. As discussed in the introduction and literature review chapters, the 
financial health of a business should have an impact on the reaction by the market when a business 
decides to make use of equity funding in the form of a rights issue.  
In order to establish whether a business is financially healthy or unhealthy, a method to assess the 
financial health of the business had to be established. One such method of corporate failure 
prediction is the Altman Z-score model developed by Professor Edward Altman in 1968. The model 
takes into consideration among other factors the debt equity ratio of the business to establish 
financial health. The model is used to predict the probability that a business will go into bankruptcy 
within two years (Narayanan, 2010). When the model was initially tested it was found to be 72% 
accurate in its predictions.  In subsequent tests over a period of 31 years it was found to be 80-90% 
accurate in predicting bankruptcy one year before the event. The Altman Z-score model will be used 
in this study to measure the financial health (distress) of a business.  
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Data to calculate the Altman Z-score was obtained from the latest annual financial statements that 
were issued prior to the announcement date of the rights issues (being the event date). Other 
relevant data used in the calculation was obtained from the I-Net BNF McGregor database.  
The formula for the Z-score is as follows: 
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.99X5   …………………………………………………..…Equation 12 
The inputs for the Z-score are as follows: 
• X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets 
• X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
• X3 = EBIT/Total Assets 
• X4 = Market Capital/Book value of Total Liabilities 
• X5 = Sales/Total Assets 
The result can be interpreted as follows: 
Healthy: > 2.99 
Grey zone: 1.81 – 2.99 
Unhealthy zone: < 1.81 
For purpose of grouping the companies according to the Altman Z-score model the above ranges 
were used, resulting into three groups of events. The event companies were then classified as 
“healthy”, “grey zone” and “unhealthy” according to their respective Altman Z-scores. An event 
study was then performed on the 25 events in the event sample after being classified according to 
their Altman Z-score. The abnormal returns were calculated using the APT-model, as described 
above, for the event windows -60 to -2 days, -1 to 1 days and 2 to 60 days.  
A paired two samples for means test was used to calculate the t-statistic for the event windows. The 
t-statistic was used to calculate the p-value and the results were tested for statistical significance at 
the 95% confidence level. 
3.2.3 Part 3: Testing the Impact of Reason for Rights Issues on Market Reaction  
The next step in the methodology of this study, as described in the introduction and the literature 
review, was to classify the rights issue events according to the reason for equity being raised. This 
classifying process involved that the reason for the event had to be established.  The SENS 
announcements of the events were obtained from the Sharedata website. The SENS announcements 
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were scrutinised to ascertain exactly what the reason provided for the use of the rights issue 
proceeds was. After scrutinising the SENS announcements for the sample of equity issuing events, 
two distinct reasons for the use of the proceeds were identified. The reasons were firstly to repay 
outstanding debt, or to invest in growth opportunities, which for the purpose of this study were 
classified as “invest”. Interestingly, all SENS announcements for all the events provided a clear 
reason for the rights being issued.  
The event companies were then classified according to the reason provided in the SENS 
announcement as either “investment” or “debt repayment”, according to their respective 
announcement. An event study was then performed on the 25 events in the event sample after 
being classified according to their reason why the rights were being issued. The abnormal returns 
were calculated using the APT-model as described above for the event windows -60 to -2 days, -1 to 
1 days and 2 to 60 days.  
A paired two samples for means test was used to calculate the t-statistic for the event windows. The 
t-statistic was used to calculate the p-value and the results were tested for statistical significance at 
the 95% confidence level. Table 2 graphically shows the final sample of companies issuing rights 
issues, as well as their financial health classification according to Altman Z-score, and the reason 
provided for the intended use of the proceeds of the rights issue.  
Table 2: The final event sample by categorisation 
 
 
1 Ellies Holdings Ltd ELI 06-Oct-14 4 950 000 000                  3.32 Healthy Debt repayment
2 Putprop Ltd PPR 06-Feb-14 100 039 703                     5.24 Healthy Investment
3 Invicta Holdings Ltd IVT 10-Nov-14 2 250 000 000                  2.36 Grey zone Investment
4 Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd SHF 02-Jul-14 18 200 000 000               1.74 Unhealthy Investment
5 Curro Holdings Ltd COH 18-Feb-14 589 594 780                     4.99 Healthy Investment
6 Aquarius Platinum Ltd AQP 07-Apr-14 2 352 658 643                  4.03 Healthy Debt repayment
7 Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd RBP 04-Mar-14 800 000 025                     1.81 Grey zone Investment
8 Sacoil Holdings Ltd SCL 07-Nov-13 336 582 418                     1.82 Grey zone Debt repayment
9 Northam Platinum Ltd NHM 20-Sep-13 600 000 000                     2.88 Grey zone Debt repayment
10 Lonmin Plc LON 09-Nov-12 7 122 635 206                  2.08 Grey zone Debt repayment
11 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd CPI 26-Sep-12 2 248 000 000                  2.13 Grey zone Investment
12 Mediclinic International MDC 01-Aug-12 5 000 000 000                  1.31 Unhealthy Debt repayment
13 Pallinghurst Resources Ltd PGL 11-Jun-12 800 000 000                     562.92 Healthy Investment
14 Octodec Investments Ltd OCT 11-Jul-12 300 000 000                     0.86 Unhealthy Investment
15 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd MUR 29-Feb-12 2 000 000 000                  2.36 Grey zone Debt repayment
16 Tradehold Ltd TDH 09-Mar-11 650 000 000                     -0.42 Unhealthy Investment
17 Sovereign Food Investments Ltd SOV 21-Oct-10 150 000 000                     2.12 Grey zone Investment
18 Esorfranki Ltd ESR 25-Nov-10 200 000 000                     3.20 Healthy Investment
19 Digicore Holdings Ltd DGC 16-Nov-10 90 000 000                       4.92 Healthy Investment
20 Omnia Holdings OMN 20-May-10 1 000 000 000                  3.49 Healthy Investment
21 Eqstra Holdings Ltd EQS 19-Apr-10 650 000 001                     1.49 Unhealthy Debt repayment
22 Hulamin Ltd HLM 26-Apr-10 750 000 000                     2.12 Grey zone Investment
23 Distribution and Warehousing Network Ltd DAW 21-Oct-09 299 999 995                     3.67 Healthy Investment
24 Super Group Ltd SPG 18-Mar-09 1 000 000 000                  1.54 Unhealthy Debt repayment
25 Zeder Investments Ltd ZED 26-Mar-09 500 000 000                     14.32 Healthy Investment
Proceeds ReasonCompany name Ticker code Announcement date Nominal value Z-Score "Health"
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3.2.4 Part 4: Testing Managements Ability to time the Market when Performing Rights Issues  
The final component of the methodology applied by this study, as discussed in the introduction and 
literature review sections, was to investigate whether there was an element of Market Timing 
theory present when the rights issue events occurred. It was decided to use a regression 
methodology to ascertain whether there was a relationship between the abnormal returns of the 
shares and the valuation of the shares as measured by the market to book ratios of the companies 
(as used by Baker and Wurgler, 2002, and discussed in the literature review section) in the sample. 
Dong, Loncarski, Horst and Veld, 2012 find that in order to test the Market Timing theory a measure 
of equity valuation and share price performance must be defined. They use the market-to-book ratio 
as the proxy for value, and the abnormal share price returns as the measure for share price 
performance. The market-to-book ratio is measured as the market value of the equity of the 
business divided by the book value of the equity. Dong, Loncarski, Horst and Veld, 2012 performed a 
cross-sectional multivariate regression analysis to provide a more robust test of the Market Timing 
hypothesis and to also explore the Pecking Order theory. They find that when businesses are not 
financially constrained (measured by the KZ-index/Altman Z-score) there is evidence that businesses 
issue equity when their shares are overvalued, and evidence that overvalued issuers earn lower 
post-announcement abnormal share price returns. Their findings highlight an interaction between 
the Market Timing and Pecking Order theories. This study uses the post-announcement abnormal 
share price returns as the dependent variable, which is regressed against the market-to-book ratio, 
the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index as a measure of financial constraint, capital expenditure incurred 
by the business divided by the total assets of the business, and an interaction term (the KZ-index 
multiplied by the market-to-book ratio of equity), as independent variables.  
In the current study the Altman Z-score was used as the measure for financial constraint as used by 
Coelho, Correia and West (2013). A regression analysis was performed on the event sample of 25 
events. One event, Pallinghurst Resources Ltd, which had an Altman Z-score of 562.92, was excluded 
from the sample, as this value was an extreme outlier (See the regression sample in Table 8 in the 
appendix).  The dependent variable was the cumulative abnormal returns for the event sample from 
day +2 to day +60. The first independent variable was the market-to-book ratio. The second 
independent variable was the capital expenditure as reported in the last published annual financial 
statements before the rights issue event. The third independent variable was the market capital five 
days before the rights issue announcement day. The fourth independent variable was the Altman Z-
score calculated on the last reported year end. The fifth independent variable was the control 
variable Altman Z-score as a function of the market-to-book ratio.  
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Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 
In previous chapters four hypotheses were stated, and the methodology described that was used to 
test these hypotheses. In this chapter the results of this study will be discussed and analysed for 
each hypothesis in turn.  
4.1 Period disbursement of the initial events sample 
In the figure below the initial 72 rights issue events are grouped over the sample period of five 
years, to show when the events occurred. This indicates a surprisingly large number of events 
shortly after the financial crisis of 2008, with a slowdown in rights issue events in 2011. During 
2012 rights issues events picked up again which seem logical considering that in 2012 worldwide 
stock exchanges had record share price returns after the earlier financial crisis. 
Figure 1: Events occurrence over the sample period. 
 
4.2 The impact of rights issue announcement events on share prices  
For hypothesis one,  the null hypothesis stated that rights offers do not affect cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) in share price performance, while the alternative hypothesis states that 
rights issues negatively affect cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR’s). A graphical 
representation of the results found for this hypothesis for the JSE over the study period, using 
respectively the APT and CAPM models, is shown in Figures 2 and 3 below. As can be seen, there is a 
slight decrease in abnormal returns from day -60 to day -42 from no real cumulative abnormal 
return (CAAR) to -0.5% cumulative abnormal return.  From day -42 to day -31 there is a recovery in 
the cumulative abnormal returns of almost 0.5%. After that an abnormal share price decline roughly 
from day -31 to day -10 prior to the rights issue announcement day from -0.30% CAAR to -1.84% 
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cumulative abnormal return, which may suggest that there may be some level of pre-emption by the 
market, at least as measured by the APT-model.  This finding is similar to that of Cotterel (2011). 
From the -10 day to the event day (announcement day) there seems to be a slight increase in the 
cumulative abnormal returns from -1.84% to -1.73%. This could be due to investors being optimistic 
about the reason provided for the rights issue event, and that they interpret the rights issue event as 
a positive signal to the market of potential things to come in the future. From the event day to day 
+14 the cumulative abnormal returns takes a drastic drop from -1.73% to -2.34%, which shows the 
effect of the rights issue announcement on the abnormal return of the share price. Then from day 
+14 to roughly day +55 the cumulative abnormal returns seems to drift rather flat at the -2.40% level 
until day +57 when it drastically takes a dip to -2.73% on day +58 and to -2.90% on day +60. This last 
negative movement in the cumulative abnormal returns of the share price could be the start of the 
medium to long-term negative reaction to the rights issue announcement.  
Figure 2: The APT-Model Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
 
In Figure 2 the CAAR’s for the CAPM-model can be seen graphically. The shape of the line of the 
CAPM-model differs from the shape of the line of the APT-model, with a much steeper downward 
gradient than the APT-model line. This occurrence could be due to the fact that the APT-model 
incorporates into its market premium both the financial and industrial index as well as the mining or 
in other words the resources index while the CAPM-model only incorporates the JSE all share index 
(ALSI) as its market premium component. Thus, in the APT-model the abnormal returns fluctuate 
with the combination of the financials and industrial as well as the mining indexes. While with the 
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CAPM-model the abnormal returns of the share prices only fluctuates with one component the all 
share index.  
When we analyse the CAPM-models graph we can see that there is a negative cumulative abnormal 
return (CAAR) in the share price from -0.02% on day -60 to -1.2% on day -44. From day -44 to day -34 
there is a slight recovery to a cumulative abnormal return of only -0.9%. From day -33 there is a 
steady decline in the cumulative abnormal returns of the share price returns from -1.0% to -2.1% on 
day -2. This could indicate some level of pre-emption by the market of expecting a possible 
corporate action- in this case specifically a rights issue.  For the event announcement period of day -
1 to day +1 the cumulative abnormal returns stays relatively stable at the -2.1% which could indicate 
that the market already factored in the rights issue into the share price. From day +2 to day +60 the 
cumulative abnormal returns takes a turn for the worse as it declines from -2.2% to -4.9% on day 
+60. This shows the full effect of the rights issue’s impact on the abnormal returns of the share 
prices.   
Figure 3: The CAPM-Model Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
 
The average abnormal returns for the selected sample report a negative 0.20% average abnormal 
return on the day that the company announces the rights issue, followed by an additional negative 
0.05% AAR on the following day for the APT-model. The CAPM-model showed a negative AAR of 
0.12% followed by a negative 0.02% one day after the announcement. Below are the graphs that 
depict the AAR’s of the two models. See Appendix 2 for the detailed AAR’s. 
35 
 
Figure 4: APT-Model Daily Average Abnormal Returns 
 
 
Figure 5: CAPM-Model Daily Average Abnormal Returns 
 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, according to the APT-model, were -1.73% on the day that 
the rights issue was announced, and -1.78% on the day after the announcement. CAAR’s, according 



























indicate for the period 60 days prior to the announcement to 2 days prior to the announcement 
were -1.62% for the APT-model and -2.14% for the CAPM-model with the returns from the CAPM-
model showing statistical significance for the period. The CAAR’s for days (-1,1) were -0.16% for the 
APT-model and -0.10% for the CAPM-model. CAAR’s for days (2,60) were -1.12% for the APT-model 
and -2.69% for the CAPM-model with the returns from the CAPM-model showing statistical 
significance at the 95% confidence level. 
Table 3 CAAR’s for specific intervals: 
 
*denotes significance at the 10% level ** denotes significance at the 5% level *** denotes significance at the 
1% level. 
Comparing the two models the CAAR’s at day 60 for the APT-model is -2.90% and statistically 
significant at the 95% level with a p-value of 0.0181, and for the CAPM-model was -4.9% which is 
statistically significant at the 99% level with a p-value of 0.0001. 
Comparing the two models the APT-model shows more erratic behaviour than the CAPM-model as 
can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. The results nonetheless are similar in magnitude and in a consistent 
direction, and thereby confirming each other. The results for both models around the event date are 
not as negative as those found by Bhana (1999), who found a -3.51% cumulative average abnormal 
share price return over the two day announcement period, Pascoe, Ward and MacKenzie, who found 
-3% abnormal returns on the announcement day by using two different models, or Eckbo, Masulis 
and Norli (2000), who found a -3% cumulative average abnormal share price return over the two-day 
announcement window (2000).  
The CAPM-model also indicates a -3.4% cumulative average abnormal share price return at day t+25 
and a -3.7% cumulative average abnormal share price return at day t+37 with the maximum negative 
CAAR being -4.9% at day t+60 which indicates a gradual decline in the CAAR’s. Interestingly in the 
APT-model there is a slight increase in the CAAR’s just before the rights announcements, being 
roughly around t-14 days. Both models agree on the negative impact that a rights issue has on the 
share price performance and this is confirmed by the statistics conducted. 
 
Event Days APT Model P-Value CAPM Model P-Value
CAAR CAAR
(-60,-2) -1.62% 0.076* -2.14% 0.0058***
(-1,1) -0.16% 0.5907 -0.10% 0.5775
(2,60) -1.12% 0.1613 -2.69% 0.0001***
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Hypothesis 1 is restated below: 
H0: CAAR = 0        Equation 1 
Ha: CAAR <0        Equation 2 
Based on the results presented, specifically Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Rights issue announcements are found to have a statistically significant negative impact on 
the cumulative average abnormal returns of the issuers share price performance after the 
announcement period when using the CAPM-model. 
4.3 The impact of the financial position (“health”) of a rights issuing company on abnormal share 
price returns  
For Hypothesis 2 two, the  null hypothesis states that the financial position of a business making a 
rights issue, as measured by the Altman Z-score, will have no impact on the nature of its post-issue 
abnormal share price returns. The alternative hypothesis states that the financial position of the 
issuer will affect the nature of the abnormal share price returns post the rights issue.  
Table 4 shows the Daily Average Abnormal Returns of the companies grouped according to the three 
categories as determined by the Altman Z-score model to be Healthy, Unhealthy or in the Grey 
(uncertain) zone. It was not possible to obtain sufficiently large samples for each of the categories to 
do a meaningful statistical analysis, but the results are nonetheless presented for interest sake. This 
will be one of the areas that can be addressed in future research. See Appendix 3 for the detailed 
daily AAR’s. 
Table 4: Sample categorised according to Altman Z-score. 
Data Used Group Frequency Percent 
APT Model 
Healthy 10 40% 
Grey Zone 9 36% 
  Unhealthy 6 24% 
  Total 25 100% 
The Cumulative Average Abnormal Results as shown in Table 5 and shown graphically in Figure 5 
indicate that the share price abnormal returns of companies classified as healthy are the most 





Table 5: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns grouped by Altman Z-score 
 
Analysis of Figure 6 and Table 5 indicates that all companies (unhealthy, healthy or grey zone) have 
negative post rights issue announcement Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. Very interestingly, 
companies classified as healthy have -3.73% CAAR’s for the -60 day to -2 day, -0.30% for the period 
t-1 days to t+1 days, and -1.63% for the period t+2 days to t+60 days. 
Figure 6: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns categorised in to the Altman Z-score groups. 
 
Companies in the grey zone have CAAR’s prior to the rights issue of 0.06 and during the 
announcement period 0.01 with the CAAR’s falling dramatically to -1.74% after the announcement 
period. Companies classified as unhealthy have CAAR’s before the announcement period of -0.62%, 
during the announcement period -0.17% and after the announcement period -0.63%.   
Hypothesis 2 was stated as follows:  
H0: CAAR(financially healthy) = CAAR(financially unhealthy)  Equation 3 
Ha: CAAR(financially healthy ) ≠ CAAR(financially unhealthy)  Equation 4 
Event Days Unhealthy P-Value Grey Zone P-Value Healthy P-Value
CAAR CAAR CAAR
(-60,-2) -0.62% 0.7191 0.06% 0.9676 -3.73% 0.0038
(-1,1) -0.17% 0.7572 0.01% 0.9739 -0.30% 0.6237


































































Unfortunately the sample sizes were not big enough to conduct a proper statistical test of these 
hypotheses. Given the graphical results presented in Figure 3, it appears that there is at least 
qualitative evidence that the financial position of the issuer of a rights issue, as categorised by their 
Altman Z-score, may have an impact on the share price reaction to the announcement of a rights 
issue. In other words, there is preliminary evidence that for financially healthy companies the 
market indeed is negatively surprised by a rights issue (although there is signs of anticipation of this 
from 30 days prior to the announcement) , while the same may not true for financially constrained 
and borderline companies.  Negative CAARs for healthy companies seem to persist for at least the 60 
days window period subsequent to the announcement date. A larger sample size will however be 
required in order to robustly test this hypothesis, and is one of the suggestions for future research. It 
is interesting to note that two companies Mediclinic and Steinhoff both calculated an “unhealthy” 
Altman Z-score. Subsequent to the event study period both these companies performed 
exceptionally well and are seen as blue chip share investments by the market. Steinhoff calculated 
an “unhealthy” score mainly due to the low earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Mediclinic 
calculated a low score and subsequent “unhealthy” status due to low retained earnings, earnings 
before interest and tax, and low market capital compared to its total assets. The main contributor in 
both cases was the low EBIT as a percentage of the total assets which contributes the biggest to the 
Altman Z-score. This indicates that both companies did not succeed enough in sweating the high 
asset base into producing more earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). 
4.4 The impact of the reason for the rights issue on abnormal share price returns  
For Hypothesis 3, the null hypothesis states that the stated reason for the rights issue (here classified 
as either repaying debt or investing (for growth opportunities) does not impact the nature of post-
issue abnormal share price returns. The alternative hypothesis states that the market will react 
differently depending on the reason given for the right issue (again differentiated as above) Table 6 
shows the classification according to the stated reason for the rights issue. Similarly to the sample 
available for Hypothesis 3, the sample available for this part of the study by category was quite 
small, and hence limits the robustness of results reported.  
Table 6: Sample grouped by stated reason for equity issue 
Data Used Group Frequency Percent 
APT Model 
Invest 16 64% 
Repayment of Debt 9 36% 




In Table 7 the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns can be seen for the APT-model. The returns are 
categorised according to the reason provided by the issuing companies for the rights issue. The 
classification was done by grouping the companies into companies that will use the proceeds of the 
rights issue to invest in new opportunities and those that will repay outstanding debt obligations. 
For companies that communicated that the proceeds will be used to invest in new opportunities,  
the average abnormal share price returns for the period t-60 days to t-2 days were 1.03%, for days t-
1 to days t+1 -0.18%, and for the days t+2 to t+60 days were 1.01%. None of the results were 
statistically significant. See Appendix 4 for detailed daily AAR’s.  
Table 7: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns grouped by Reason for Issuing 
 
However, companies that communicated that the proceeds of the rights issue will be used to settle 
outstanding debt obligations, average abnormal share price returns for the period t-60 days to t-2 
days were -6.34%, and were statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The returns for the 
period t-1 days to t+1 days were -0.11%, and not statistically significant. The returns for the period 
t+2 days to t+60 days were -4.91%. Figure 4 gives a graphical depiction of the CAAR’s. 
Figure 7: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns classified by the reason given for the rights issue. 
 
 
Event Days Invest P-Value Repay Debt P-Value
CAAR CAAR
(-60,-2) 1.03% 0.2815 -6.34% 0.0009
(-1,1) -0.18% 0.5228 -0.11% 0.816
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Hypothesis 3 was stated as follows: 
 H0: CAAR(debt repayment) = CAAR(investment)    Equation 5 
Again, given the small sample sizes at the category level, a robust statistical conclusion cannot be 
drawn. However, again the qualitative results (Figure 4) shows preliminary evidence that there is a 
difference between companies that conduct rights issues to repay debt, and those that do this to 
invest in growth. However, as there is no discernible CAAR effect on the date of the announcements 
(day 0), in this case it does not appear that there is a clear market reaction to the actual 
announcement. Rather, companies that do issue equity for investment display a substantially flat 
CAAR pattern, while those who issue equity to repay debt show a continuous negative CAAR trend 
over the event window, perhaps indicating that the market on average sees these companies in a 
negative light well before the actual debt rights issue announcement.  It is thus quite reasonable to 
assume that these companies are mostly those in financial trouble for an extended period of time 
before the actual event. This is confirmed when it is found that 50% of the businesses that are 
classified according to Altman Z-score as “unhealthy”, actually reported that the proceeds of the 
rights issue was going to be used to repay outstanding debt.  A more robust test will, however, 
probably require a larger sample, and is a possible avenue for future research.     
4.5 The ability of management to time the market when performing rights issues 
The final aspect of the study was to investigate if there were any indication of an ability to time the 
market when performing rights issues.  
Hypothesis four was stated as follows: 
Post-announcement abnormal share price returns should be negatively correlated to the market-to-









Table 8: Regression analysis sample 
 
When running the regression analysis between the dependent variable CAR (2,60) and the market-
to-book ratio, a t-statistic of 1.079 is found with a corresponding p-value of 0.2945 (see appendix). 
No statistical significant relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns from day 2 to day 60 
and the market-to-book ratio of each company was observed when performing a regression analysis 
on the below sample. This indicates that there is no real evidence or support for the Market Timing 
theory in the sample. The regression analysis descriptive statistics is included in Appendix 1. 
  
Independent Variables Independent Variables Independent Variables Independent Variables Independent Variables
Dependent Variable X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
Ticker Y Market/Book - Ratio Capex/Total Assets Market Capital (ZAR) Altman-Z-Score Altman Z-Score x 
Company name Code CAR(2,60) 5 trading days before announcement 5 trading days before announcement Last reported year end Market/Book - Ratio
Ellies Holdings Ltd ELI -12.32% 0.56                                                                     0.02 573 625 755                                                      3.32 1.85
Putprop Ltd PPR 5.51% 0.58                                                                     0.00 191 185 261                                                      5.24 3.02
Invicta Holdings Ltd IVT 4.60% 2.15                                                                     0.02                                       7 641 267 888                                                   2.36                                       5.06
Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd SHF 15.54% 1.79                                                                     0.04                                       119 689 929 416                                              1.74                                       3.12
Curro Holdings Ltd COH 12.70% 5.04                                                                     0.33                                       7 876 906 127                                                   4.99                                       25.13
Aquarius Platinum Ltd AQP -2.44% 10.31                                                                  0.02                                       3 049 891 117                                                   4.03                                       41.50
Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd RBP -0.17% 0.66                                                                     0.05                                       10 629 276 352                                                1.81                                       1.21
Sacoil Holdings Ltd SCL 3.98% 0.74                                                                     0.01                                       267 713 199                                                      1.82                                       1.34
Northam Platinum Ltd NHM 3.18% 1.47                                                                     0.13                                       15 858 193 430                                                2.88                                       4.22
Lonmin Plc LON -6.62% 3.94                                                                     0.03                                       14 236 352 140                                                2.08                                       8.19
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd CPI 8.72% 4.32                                                                     0.01                                       21 265 958 448                                                2.13                                       9.18
Mediclinic International MDC 4.54% 2.22                                                                     0.03                                       25 368 543 611                                                1.31                                       2.91
Octodec Investments Ltd OCT 5.55% 1.28                                                                     0.06                                       1 585 030 128                                                   0.86                                       1.10
Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd MUR -12.63% 1.77                                                                     0.04                                       9 392 561 117                                                   2.36                                       4.16
Tradehold Ltd TDH -9.46% 0.69                                                                     0.00                                       240 700 001                                                      -0.42                                      -0.28
Sovereign Food Investments Ltd SOV -6.04% 0.56                                                                     0.06                                       234 302 256                                                      2.12                                       1.19
Esorfranki Ltd ESR -14.55% 0.80                                                                     0.06                                       649 648 674                                                      3.20                                       2.57
Digicore Holdings Ltd DGC -4.09% 1.55                                                                     0.09                                       772 725 915                                                      4.92                                       7.64
Omnia Holdings OMN 4.05% 1.52                                                                     0.07                                       3 000 836 385                                                   3.49                                       5.32
Eqstra Holdings Ltd EQS 7.37% 0.85                                                                     0.31                                       1 550 339 220                                                   1.49                                       1.27
Hulamin Ltd HLM -2.44% 6.33                                                                     0.05                                       2 226 806 810                                                   2.12                                       13.40
Distribution and Warehousing Network Ltd DAW -9.17% 1.91                                                                     0.04                                       1 604 496 003                                                   3.67                                       7.01
Super Group Ltd SPG -19.72% 0.04                                                                     0.04                                       360 040 668                                                      1.54                                       0.07
Zeder Investments Ltd ZED 11.90% 0.51                                                                     0.15                                       880 236 465                                                      14.32                                     7.30
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
 The purpose of this study was to firstly investigate what the impact of the announcement of rights 
issues would have on the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) in the share price 
performance of companies issuing. This study was conducted on companies issuing rights issue on 
the JSE in the period January 2009 to December 2014. This study found, using the APT-model, over 
the event window of t-60 days to t+60 days a negative CAAR of 2.90% and applying the CAPM-model 
a negative CAAR of 4.90%. This finding is similar to the findings of Cotterell, (2011); Bhana (1998) 
and Pascoe, Ward & MacKenzie, (2005). This shows support for the Signalling theory as investigated 
by Myers and Majluf, 1984; Asquith and Mullins, 1986 where issuing of equity are perceived as 
negative signals to the market. This also shows support for the information asymmetry theory 
created by Stiglitz, 2002 that the issue of equity (rights issues) convey information from the insiders 
(management) to the outsiders (the market and providers of funding). This study also supports the 
findings of Spiess & Affleck-Graves (1995); Loughran and Ritter, (1995); Bayless and Jay, (2008) and 
Autore, Bray and Peterson (2009) who found negative share price reaction after a rights issue. 
The second area of investigation of this study was if the financial “health” of the issuer of the rights 
issue had an impact on the cumulative average abnormal returns of the company performing the 
issue. The study found a negative cumulative average abnormal return of 1.67% for companies 
classified as in the “grey zone”. A negative CAAR of 0.17% was found for companies classified as in 
the “unhealthy zone” and a negative CAAR of 5.66% was found for companies classified in the 
“healthy zone”. These findings was in contrast to the findings of Cotterell, 2011 who found that 
companies classified as in the “healthy zone” recovered faster than companies classified in the 
“unhealthy and grey zone”. The above results are, however, based on a small sample, and hence not 
statistically definitive. 
The third area that this study investigated was the impact that the reason provided by the 
management of the company performing the rights issue for what they were going to use the 
proceeds for had on the cumulative average abnormal returns in the share price of the companies 
issuing the rights issue. Issuers who reported that the proceeds of the rights issue was going to be 
used to “invest” had a positive CAAR over the total event period of 1.86%. Issuers who reported that 
the proceeds of the rights issue was going to be used to repay “debt” had a negative CAAR over the 
total event window of 11.37%. Similarly to the previous research area, this component of the study 
was also restricted by a small sample, and hence is also not statistically definitive.  
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The final area that this study investigated was whether there was any indication of market timing 
evident when companies were performing rights issues. A regression analysis was performed to 
investigate whether there was a relationship between the cumulative average abnormal returns for 
day +2 to +60 and the market-to-book value which was used as a proxy for the value of the 
company. No statistical significant relationship could be found that indicated that the valuation of 
the company played an important role in the abnormal returns of the share price. Thus no real 
evidence for market timing was found in the event sample. 
In summary, this study found evidence that rights issues affect share price performance negatively. 
It was shown that after a rights issue announcement the share price of an issuing company had 
immediate negative abnormal returns when measured against the market. In provisional 
investigations, this study also found that the financial position of an issuing company, and the reason 
specified by management for the rights issue, affects the market’s reaction as measured by share 
price abnormal return. With regards to the latter, when management specified that the reason for 
the rights issue was for investment purposes abnormal share price returns were positive, in contrast 
to debt repayments, where the abnormal share price returns were negative. Both of the latter areas 
of investigation were hampered by small sample sizes, however.  Lastly, it was found that South 
African company managements are either not able (or not attempting) to time the market in their 
decision to issue additional shares.  
This study had some limitations. The first was that it was conducted only on shares listed on the JSE 
for the period January 2009 to December 2014. The second was a small sample compared to the 
initial sample mostly due to confounding events occurring at the same time of the rights issue event. 
Areas for future research could possibly focus on using a larger sample and collecting data over a 
longer period which will give the study more depth and breadth to any statistical results that will be 
extracted. Another area for future study could be that the JSE all share index is not so mining heavy 
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 Appendix 1: 
Below are the descriptive statistics of the regression analysis which was performed to test the 
market timing theory. 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics for the regression analysis 
 

















Adjusted R Square 0.32
Standard Error 0.08
Observations 24
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept -0.11 0.04 -2.87 0.01
Market/Book - Ratio 0.02 0.02 1.08 0.29
Capex/Total Assets 0.46 0.21 2.22 0.04
Market Capital (ZAR) 0.00 0.00 2.64 0.02
Altman-Z-Score 0.01 0.01 1.74 0.10




The table below shows the daily average abnormal returns (AAR’s) for the events.    
Table 12: Daily AAR’s for the events. 








 AAR% P-value AAR% 
-60 0.01% 0.958 -0.02% 
-59 -0.08% 0.481 -0.06% 
-58 0.09% 0.377 -0.02% 
-57 -0.01% 0.939 -0.04% 
-56 -0.13% 0.253 -0.18% 
-55 0.06% 0.668 0.13% 
-54 -0.02% 0.866 -0.16% 
-53 0.01% 0.956 0.00% 
-52 -0.19% 0.059 -0.11% 
-51 -0.04% 0.642 -0.09% 
-50 -0.07% 0.647 -0.15% 
-49 -0.02% 0.865 -0.04% 
-48 -0.02% 0.827 -0.12% 
-47 0.09% 0.442 -0.04% 
-46 0.06% 0.665 -0.02% 
-45 0.11% 0.355 -0.02% 
-44 -0.28% 0.120 -0.23% 
-43 -0.07% 0.582 0.00% 
-42 0.00% 0.984 -0.04% 
-41 0.08% 0.552 0.08% 
-40 0.07% 0.574 0.04% 
-39 0.01% 0.885 0.02% 
-38 -0.13% 0.374 -0.08% 
-37 0.05% 0.332 0.04% 
-36 0.28% 0.004 0.22% 
-35 -0.05% 0.664 -0.02% 
-34 0.00% 0.961 -0.02% 
-33 0.03% 0.869 -0.05% 
-32 -0.20% 0.250 -0.22% 
-31 0.07% 0.614 0.08% 
-30 0.03% 0.612 0.03% 
-29 0.12% 0.374 0.09% 
-28 0.01% 0.924 0.01% 
-27 -0.06% 0.588 -0.14% 
-26 -0.11% 0.303 -0.12% 
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-25 -0.02% 0.885 0.09% 
-24 -0.21% 0.196 -0.17% 
-23 -0.09% 0.514 -0.12% 
-22 -0.16% 0.108 -0.11% 
-21 0.01% 0.944 0.02% 
-20 -0.04% 0.615 -0.06% 
-19 -0.10% 0.470 0.02% 
-18 -0.22% 0.170 -0.08% 
-17 -0.18% 0.085 -0.12% 
-16 -0.12% 0.423 -0.17% 
-15 -0.02% 0.907 -0.07% 
-14 0.15% 0.188 0.05% 
-13 -0.22% 0.207 -0.20% 
-12 -0.19% 0.066 0.03% 
-11 -0.11% 0.374 -0.10% 
-10 -0.03% 0.771 -0.06% 
-9 0.03% 0.823 0.06% 
-8 0.15% 0.237 0.18% 
-7 -0.24% 0.024 -0.13% 
-6 0.13% 0.246 0.10% 
-5 -0.05% 0.708 -0.01% 
-4 0.05% 0.526 0.01% 
-3 0.24% 0.061 0.06% 
-2 -0.09% 0.516 -0.11% 
-1 0.09% 0.503 0.05% 
0 -0.20% 0.132 -0.12% 
1 -0.05% 0.670 -0.02% 
2 -0.03% 0.831 -0.02% 
3 -0.05% 0.705 -0.08% 
4 -0.26% 0.161 -0.19% 
5 0.05% 0.633 -0.02% 
6 -0.09% 0.366 -0.08% 
7 -0.03% 0.771 -0.04% 
8 -0.19% 0.244 -0.09% 
9 0.19% 0.090 0.12% 
10 0.01% 0.917 0.01% 
11 -0.10% 0.326 -0.11% 
12 -0.15% 0.034 -0.14% 
13 -0.21% 0.099 -0.19% 
14 0.21% 0.087 0.12% 
15 -0.03% 0.701 -0.05% 
16 0.02% 0.826 -0.03% 
17 -0.12% 0.164 -0.04% 
18 0.03% 0.724 0.00% 
19 0.17% 0.088 -0.01% 
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20 -0.05% 0.631 -0.10% 
21 -0.06% 0.618 -0.08% 
22 -0.03% 0.843 -0.03% 
23 -0.06% 0.548 0.00% 
24 0.00% 0.976 -0.05% 
25 -0.04% 0.557 -0.07% 
26 -0.02% 0.827 0.01% 
27 0.19% 0.063 0.01% 
28 0.06% 0.663 0.04% 
29 -0.11% 0.264 -0.10% 
30 0.05% 0.654 -0.04% 
31 0.12% 0.173 0.06% 
32 -0.05% 0.567 0.05% 
33 0.05% 0.560 -0.04% 
34 -0.06% 0.647 0.06% 
35 -0.04% 0.680 -0.15% 
36 -0.07% 0.449 -0.09% 
37 0.05% 0.671 -0.06% 
38 -0.03% 0.700 -0.04% 
39 0.20% 0.013 0.13% 
40 -0.06% 0.502 -0.06% 
41 -0.09% 0.324 -0.10% 
42 0.12% 0.282 0.00% 
43 -0.16% 0.180 -0.12% 
44 -0.02% 0.813 -0.14% 
45 0.03% 0.761 -0.06% 
46 -0.07% 0.467 -0.01% 
47 0.08% 0.385 0.04% 
48 0.04% 0.700 -0.04% 
49 0.08% 0.251 -0.01% 
50 -0.04% 0.793 -0.08% 
51 -0.10% 0.252 -0.17% 
52 0.08% 0.500 -0.01% 
53 -0.11% 0.357 -0.07% 
54 0.12% 0.252 0.07% 
55 -0.01% 0.882 -0.06% 
56 -0.07% 0.465 -0.07% 
57 -0.06% 0.496 -0.13% 
58 -0.20% 0.095 -0.17% 
59 -0.11% 0.306 -0.14% 






The table below shows the daily average abnormal returns (AAR’s) for the events classified according 
to the Altman Z-score.    
Table 13: Daily AAR’s classified according to Altman Z-score 
Day Unhealthy  
Grey 
Zone Healthy  
 AAR AAR AAR 
-60 0.00% -0.08% 0.09% 
-59 0.17% -0.22% -0.11% 
-58 0.26% 0.02% 0.05% 
-57 0.16% -0.07% -0.06% 
-56 0.02% -0.24% -0.12% 
-55 0.08% -0.11% 0.19% 
-54 0.34% -0.32% 0.04% 
-53 0.15% -0.04% -0.04% 
-52 -0.16% -0.14% -0.24% 
-51 0.27% -0.05% -0.22% 
-50 -0.20% 0.05% -0.10% 
-49 -0.05% -0.01% 0.00% 
-48 0.22% -0.08% -0.12% 
-47 0.16% 0.17% -0.03% 
-46 -0.11% 0.20% 0.03% 
-45 0.07% 0.25% 0.00% 
-44 -0.02% -0.06% -0.62% 
-43 0.01% -0.30% 0.09% 
-42 -0.11% 0.01% 0.07% 
-41 -0.26% 0.20% 0.17% 
-40 -0.01% 0.07% 0.12% 
-39 0.13% -0.01% -0.04% 
-38 -0.28% -0.04% -0.13% 
-37 0.06% 0.08% 0.02% 
-36 0.34% 0.32% 0.20% 
-35 0.02% 0.07% -0.19% 
-34 -0.13% -0.14% 0.21% 
-33 -0.15% 0.20% -0.01% 
-32 -0.26% -0.32% -0.04% 
-31 0.39% -0.14% 0.05% 
-30 0.10% 0.08% -0.05% 
-29 -0.03% 0.50% -0.14% 
-28 0.29% 0.09% -0.23% 
-27 0.12% 0.06% -0.29% 
-26 -0.29% -0.17% 0.05% 
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-25 -0.40% 0.23% -0.01% 
-24 -0.13% -0.16% -0.29% 
-23 0.07% -0.04% -0.22% 
-22 -0.29% -0.07% -0.17% 
-21 -0.20% 0.22% -0.06% 
-20 -0.03% -0.08% -0.02% 
-19 -0.08% 0.20% -0.37% 
-18 -0.46% -0.08% -0.21% 
-17 -0.08% -0.11% -0.30% 
-16 0.16% -0.04% -0.36% 
-15 0.04% -0.07% -0.01% 
-14 -0.16% 0.45% 0.07% 
-13 -0.20% -0.16% -0.29% 
-12 -0.35% -0.16% -0.12% 
-11 -0.25% -0.02% -0.10% 
-10 -0.15% -0.01% 0.03% 
-9 0.27% -0.06% -0.03% 
-8 -0.08% 0.50% -0.02% 
-7 -0.53% -0.09% -0.21% 
-6 0.27% 0.01% 0.15% 
-5 -0.12% -0.08% 0.02% 
-4 0.20% 0.03% -0.01% 
-3 0.61% 0.05% 0.18% 
-2 0.00% -0.26% 0.02% 
-1 -0.33% 0.25% 0.20% 
0 -0.08% -0.04% -0.40% 
1 0.24% -0.19% -0.09% 
2 0.10% 0.13% -0.25% 
3 0.24% -0.13% -0.15% 
4 -0.41% -0.41% -0.02% 
5 0.18% -0.12% 0.12% 
6 -0.35% -0.03% 0.01% 
7 0.01% -0.04% -0.04% 
8 -0.22% -0.32% -0.06% 
9 0.29% 0.38% -0.04% 
10 -0.06% 0.06% 0.00% 
11 -0.10% -0.21% -0.01% 
12 -0.11% -0.19% -0.14% 
13 -0.60% 0.11% -0.25% 
14 0.42% 0.07% 0.21% 
15 -0.05% -0.02% -0.03% 
16 0.42% 0.02% -0.21% 
17 -0.08% -0.37% 0.08% 
18 0.10% -0.09% 0.10% 
56 
 
19 0.29% 0.19% 0.08% 
20 -0.25% -0.04% 0.06% 
21 -0.37% 0.29% -0.20% 
22 -0.42% 0.03% 0.15% 
23 0.07% 0.00% -0.20% 
24 0.32% -0.14% -0.05% 
25 -0.16% 0.05% -0.04% 
26 0.08% -0.06% -0.04% 
27 -0.02% 0.46% 0.09% 
28 0.37% -0.25% 0.15% 
29 -0.26% 0.02% -0.15% 
30 0.54% -0.01% -0.18% 
31 -0.08% 0.36% 0.01% 
32 0.02% 0.10% -0.22% 
33 0.17% -0.09% 0.09% 
34 -0.18% 0.05% -0.07% 
35 -0.14% -0.09% 0.06% 
36 0.10% -0.13% -0.13% 
37 0.32% -0.14% 0.06% 
38 0.00% 0.14% -0.20% 
39 0.42% 0.18% 0.08% 
40 0.06% -0.17% -0.04% 
41 -0.34% -0.02% -0.01% 
42 0.27% -0.08% 0.20% 
43 0.01% -0.39% -0.04% 
44 0.17% -0.11% -0.07% 
45 0.03% -0.10% 0.14% 
46 -0.04% -0.05% -0.11% 
47 -0.07% 0.09% 0.17% 
48 0.27% -0.02% -0.05% 
49 0.18% -0.01% 0.09% 
50 -0.06% 0.11% -0.15% 
51 0.06% -0.04% -0.25% 
52 0.43% -0.02% -0.04% 
53 -0.20% 0.09% -0.22% 
54 0.17% -0.07% 0.25% 
55 0.01% -0.20% 0.13% 
56 0.27% -0.23% -0.13% 
57 -0.04% -0.19% 0.05% 
58 -0.47% -0.15% -0.08% 
59 -0.34% 0.01% -0.06% 






The table below shows the daily average abnormal returns (AAR’s) for the events classified according 
to the reason provided for the rights issue.    




 AAR AAR 
-60 0.23% -0.39% 
-59 0.16% -0.50% 
-58 0.15% -0.01% 
-57 0.13% -0.25% 
-56 -0.15% -0.09% 
-55 -0.10% 0.33% 
-54 0.11% -0.25% 
-53 0.05% -0.08% 
-52 -0.18% -0.20% 
-51 -0.06% -0.01% 
-50 -0.03% -0.15% 
-49 0.06% -0.15% 
-48 0.19% -0.41% 
-47 0.20% -0.13% 
-46 0.10% -0.02% 
-45 0.14% 0.05% 
-44 -0.23% -0.36% 
-43 0.04% -0.25% 
-42 0.16% -0.27% 
-41 0.16% -0.07% 
-40 0.04% 0.12% 
-39 0.01% 0.01% 
-38 -0.08% -0.22% 
-37 -0.02% 0.19% 
-36 0.29% 0.25% 
-35 -0.06% -0.02% 
-34 0.22% -0.38% 
-33 -0.01% 0.10% 
-32 -0.11% -0.34% 
-31 0.08% 0.04% 
-30 -0.03% 0.14% 
-29 -0.07% 0.45% 
-28 -0.02% 0.07% 
-27 0.01% -0.20% 
-26 -0.01% -0.29% 
58 
 
-25 0.03% -0.10% 
-24 -0.11% -0.37% 
-23 -0.03% -0.18% 
-22 -0.19% -0.12% 
-21 -0.04% 0.09% 
-20 -0.06% -0.01% 
-19 -0.16% 0.02% 
-18 -0.07% -0.50% 
-17 -0.10% -0.31% 
-16 0.11% -0.54% 
-15 0.23% -0.46% 
-14 0.10% 0.23% 
-13 -0.17% -0.31% 
-12 -0.18% -0.20% 
-11 0.04% -0.37% 
-10 0.00% -0.07% 
-9 0.11% -0.12% 
-8 0.11% 0.24% 
-7 -0.10% -0.49% 
-6 0.05% 0.27% 
-5 -0.11% 0.06% 
-4 0.07% 0.02% 
-3 0.18% 0.34% 
-2 -0.03% -0.20% 
-1 0.10% 0.07% 
0 -0.13% -0.31% 
1 -0.15% 0.13% 
2 -0.11% 0.12% 
3 -0.03% -0.08% 
4 -0.24% -0.29% 
5 0.10% -0.05% 
6 0.06% -0.37% 
7 0.00% -0.08% 
8 -0.17% -0.24% 
9 0.08% 0.38% 
10 0.08% -0.12% 
11 -0.07% -0.16% 
12 -0.08% -0.27% 
13 -0.12% -0.36% 
14 0.24% 0.16% 
15 -0.04% -0.02% 
16 -0.06% 0.17% 
17 -0.13% -0.12% 
18 0.15% -0.17% 
59 
 
19 0.27% -0.01% 
20 -0.12% 0.08% 
21 -0.01% -0.15% 
22 0.11% -0.28% 
23 -0.09% -0.02% 
24 0.19% -0.32% 
25 -0.04% -0.03% 
26 -0.08% 0.09% 
27 0.22% 0.16% 
28 0.04% 0.09% 
29 -0.18% 0.01% 
30 0.05% 0.06% 
31 0.11% 0.12% 
32 -0.01% -0.13% 
33 0.18% -0.19% 
34 0.04% -0.22% 
35 -0.07% 0.00% 
36 -0.15% 0.06% 
37 0.14% -0.11% 
38 0.01% -0.10% 
39 0.19% 0.20% 
40 -0.05% -0.09% 
41 -0.02% -0.22% 
42 0.25% -0.11% 
43 0.07% -0.56% 
44 0.06% -0.18% 
45 0.10% -0.10% 
46 0.05% -0.28% 
47 0.12% 0.01% 
48 -0.01% 0.12% 
49 0.17% -0.08% 
50 0.06% -0.21% 
51 0.02% -0.32% 
52 0.09% 0.06% 
53 -0.13% -0.06% 
54 0.15% 0.06% 
55 0.00% -0.04% 
56 -0.10% -0.02% 
57 0.01% -0.18% 
58 -0.20% -0.18% 
59 -0.02% -0.25% 
60 -0.06% -0.08% 
 
 
